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Does Generic Advertising Help or Hurt Brand Advertising? 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the generic advertising helps or hurts 
the brand advertising within the differentiated product environments. We develop an 
analytical model that includes both generic and brand advertising expenditures 
considering vertical product differentiation. Then the analysis is devoted to examine 
how marginal effects of expenditure affect each other under product differentiation. To 
help examine the relationship, we also include a new variable, the degree of product 
differentiation. Analytical results show that when the generic advertising increases the 
product differentiation, the high quality brand tends to take benefits while the low 
quality brand loses. When generic advertising includes messages that do not 
differentiate quality attributes, the high quality brand loses while the low quality brand 
takes benefits.   
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Does Generic Advertising Help or Hurt Brand Advertising? 
 
1. Introduction 
U.S. farmers are assessed over $750 million annually through commodity checkoffs to 
fund various generic commodity promotion programs such as generic advertising, 
consumer education, and product research. Historically, major commodity groups (e.g., 
dairy, beef, and pork) have invested majority shares of their checkoff budgets in generic 
advertising. Many studies in the agricultural economics literature indicate that the 
generic advertising has successfully increased the industry demand for most commodity 
groups. One of important assumptions of generic advertising is that each industry 
produces a homogeneous product. Therefore the purpose of generic advertising is to 
increase the industry demand while expecting equal benefit to each producer. However, 
in recent years, as agricultural and food industries are more concentrated and vertically 
integrated, products of these industries become more differentiated, which leads to 
various agricultural product brands and separate brand advertising programs. Brand 
advertising intends to increase market share of its own brand by persuading consumers 
to prefer its own brand to other brands. Through various brand advertising programs, 
producers try to differentiate their products emphasizing their unique quality attributes. 
Obviously, this is not consistent with the objective of generic advertising. Opponents of 
generic advertising claim that since generic advertising sends a signal that all products 
are homogeneous, it weakens brand messages by producers of differentiated products.   
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the generic advertising helps 
or hurts the brand advertising within the differentiated product environments. We 
develop an analytical model that includes both generic and brand advertising   - 3 -
expenditures considering vertical product differentiation. Then the analysis is devoted to 
examine how marginal effects of expenditure affect each other under product 
differentiation. To help examine the relationship, we also include a new variable, the 
degree of product differentiation. Analytical results are expected to show conditions of 
complementary or substitutive relationship between the two types of advertising 
programs. A numeric simulation is to be conducted for empirical analysis for the U.S. 
dairy industry. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There have been several studies investigating the relationship between generic and 
brand advertising under product differentiation. The papers mostly focus on theoretical 
development of the effectiveness of advertising programs at firm and industry levels. 
Crespi and Marette (2002) investigate the effects of generic advertising on the product 
differentiation among competing brands. Crespi and Marette’s framework follows 
Mussa and Rosen (1978) to develop an analytical model under the assumption of 
vertical product differentiation. The analytical derivation examines how the 
effectiveness and the optimal level of brand advertising are affected by generic 
advertising when market demands are derived from consumer utilities with 
differentiated product qualities. Results of the study show that generic advertising may 
benefit the low quality producers more than the high quality producers. The findings 
bring an important implication to agricultural and food industries where products are 
becoming more differentiated. 
Hunnicutt and Israelsen (2003) examine the brand advertising effects from 
individual producers which are voluntarily funding under differentiated product industry.   - 4 -
Considering the monopolistically competitive industry, they develop a conceptual model 
for generic and brand advertising, which includes the market share and degree of 
product differentiation. Advertising benefits are clearly examined by showing the 
market expansion effects and branding effects through comparative statistic analyses. 
Chakravarti & Janiszewski (2004) examine effects of the generic advertising on the 
brand preferences through experiments under various scenarios. Results of the 
experiments suggest that the generic advertising may affect consumers’ choice of brand 
through increasing or decreasing their perceived brand differentiation. They also found 
that contrary to the objective of generic advertising, the generic advertising may 
increase the brand differentiation. Bass et al. (2005) analyze effects of generic and brand 
advertising in a duopoly market using an optimal control model. In this study, each firm 
can make decision its price, and generic and brand advertising levels. The study shows 
that a stronger firm is more likely to invest in generic advertising, and the market share 
mainly depends on the brand advertising. Crespi (2007) and Isariyawongse et al. (2007) 
extend the Crespi and Marette (2002)’s framework to vertical differentiation and 
horizontal product differentiation in duopoly market, respectively.   
Although these previous studies provide useful framework for understanding 
the relationship between generic and brand advertising programs, the relationship has 
not been clearly identified.    Most analytical results from these studies were not able to 
sign the marginal effects of optimal brand advertising and its effectiveness with respect 
to generic advertising. In addition, the empirical analysis has been rarely conducted.   
 
3. Model 
In an agricultural commodity market, we assume there are 2 firms represented i = 1, 2,   - 5 -
and each firm provides a different variant characterizing its quality ] , [
+ − ∈ q q qi . Firm 1 
produces a high quality product, denoted by brand 1. The firm 2 produces a low quality 
good, denoted by brand 2. The two types of variants are vertically differentiated such 
that if both products were offered at the same price, consumers would prefer to buy a 
good supplied from the high quality product producer, firm 1.   
The two firms conduct their own brand advertising and pay the assessment for 
the generic advertising which sets from the marketing board to increase overall industry 
demand. Firm 1 spends more brand advertising expenditure than firm 2 (B1≥B2). It is 
assumed that other variable costs of each firm are the same between the two firms.   
There is a continuum of consumers where consumers are identified by θ, the 
marginal willingness to pay for quality (intensity of preference for quality).    The 
marginal willingness to pay for quality is uniformly distributed over
+
+ − → ∞ ∈ R ) , 0 [ ] , [ θ θ . It is assumed that a consumer type θ either buys one unit of a 
brand 1 or 2, or does not buy at all, and the income is sufficient to purchase the 
commodities in the market. 
An indirect utility for a consumer type θ who purchases a brand i can be written 
by: 
 
(1)  , 2 , 1 , ) , ; , , , ( = + + − = i q P y q P y V i i i i i γδ θ γ θ δ  
 
where y is the consumer’s income and Pi is the own price which come from consumers’ 
budget constraint  y x q P i i ≤ + ) ( . Here, x is the composite commodity, and y and Pi(qi) 
are measured in terms of x (Mussa and Rosen 1978). Pi is a function of the brand’s 
perceived quality, which is, Pi=Pi(qi). qi is the perceived quality of brand 1 or 2, which   - 6 -
consumers perceive by experiencing the quality of variants or through advertising 
messages. The perceived quality is depending on intrinsic quality such as nutrition, taste, 
shape and so on (physical quality φi), generic advertising (g), and brand advertising (Bi).   
That is: qi = f(φi, Bi, g). The term δ in equation (1) represents the relative difference in 
quality between brands 1 and 2. When consumers consume brand 1, δ=q1-q2.    When 
consumers consume brand 2, δ=q2-q1. The term δ will either positively or negatively 
affect consumers’ utility depending upon the assumption on q1 and q2. Since we 
assumed that firm1prodces higher quality that firm 2, q1>q2. In this paper, δ represents 
the degree of product differentiation
1. We assume that δ depends on the brand 
advertising of the two firms and generic advertising, δ=h(Bi, Bj, g). γ is the parameter of 
the degree of product differentiation.     
  There exists the marginal consumer  θ who is indifferent between purchasing 
brand 1 or brand 2. Then, the value  θ is the solution to the equation V1(y, P1, q1, δ; θ,γ) 








Demand for each brand in the market depends on consumer preferences, 
income, products qualities or characteristics, and market prices. To simplify the 
derivation of demand functions, we assume that the income is sufficiently high, and 
consumers have unit demands. In this market, therefore, the demand function is given 
by: ) , ; , , , , ( γ θ δ j i j i
d
i q q P P Q Q = , i,j =1,2., i≠j.   
Assuming there is a continuum of consumers who are characterized by the 
consumers’ preferences (θ), which is uniformly distributed from lowest  ( )
− θ   to highest 
( )
+ θ , and consumers purchase either brand 1 or brand 2, or nothing at all, the market 
demand for each brand simply becomes the density of the consumers’ preferences in   - 7 -
one of the segments along the unit interval multiplied by the total number of consumers 
in the industry, N. Then, demand for brands 1 and 2 can be written as:
N q q P P Q
d ) ( ) , ; , , , , ( 2 1 2 1 1 θ θ γ θ δ − =
+ , and  N q q P P Q
d ) ( ) , ; , , , , ( 2 1 2 1 2
− − = θ θ γ θ δ , 
respectively. 
The total number of consumer N is a function of generic advertising, N=N(g), 
and it is increasing function with decreasing rate  ( ) 0 , 0
2 2 < ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ g N g N . It means 
that generic advertising may expand the market size as it would attract to potential 
consumers and/or it would make the variants still be consumed at some (more) level. 
The brand advertising, however, affects on the market shares and differences as it makes 
to alter the consumers’ quality perception of each brand, so that the quality perceptions 
of each good is increased with decreasing rate  ( ) 0 , 0
2 2 < ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ i i i i B q B q . 
The firms have constant unit costs of production, and we assume that these 
costs are zero, i.e., c1=c2=0, except advertising costs, Bi.    We also assume that each 
firm pays the same per-unit assessment rate g for generic advertising. Then, the profit 
function of each firm is given by: 
(2)    . 2 , 1 , ) , ; , , , , ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 = − − = Π i B q q P P Q g P i
d
i i i γ θ δ  
The generic advertising expenditures are exogenously given by the marketing 
board, and given generic advertising expenditures, two firms make decision on price 
and brand advertising expenditures. Therefore, it is reasonable to model completion in 
price and brand advertising by a two-stage game. In the first stage, firm 1 and 2 
simultaneously consider the own brand advertising expenditures given the rate of g. In 
the second stage, the firms compete through prices by simultaneously choosing their 
prices, so that the prices are the Nash equilibrium prices.     - 8 -
To solve the two-stage game by backward induction, we first determine the 
equilibrium prices of two firms. Taking derivatives the equation (2) with respect to the 
own price of each firm, and then simultaneously solving the first order condition can get 
the Nash equilibrium prices as:   
(3) 
( )












+ − − =
+ + − =
− +
− +
γ θ θ δ
γ θ θ δ
 




1 P P > , which is consistent with the vertical 
product differentiation assumption posited previously. 
Replacing prices in the profit function, equation (2), with the equilibrium prices 
in equation (3) gives equilibrium profits of the two firms as: 





B N − ⋅ + − = Π
− + γ θ θ δ , 





B N − ⋅ − − = Π
− + γ θ θ δ . 
Since the equilibrium profits means that the profit maximization levels for the 
two firms, we assume that the optimal levels of the brand advertising for each firm exist 
and include in the equilibrium profits. The optimal brand advertising is denoted by
*
i B , 
which is a function of generic advertising g, i.e. ) (
* * g B B i i = . These optimal brand 
advertising levels can be obtained by solving optimal profit equations (4) and (5) 
simultaneously. Taking derivatives the optimal profits with respect to the brand 
advertising, and then the first order conditions can be written as:   
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As differentiating the first order conditions with respect to g, the effects of 













































































































































<0 and from the 






















<0. Since a successful generic advertising program is 







  However, signs of 
other terms are undetermined at this point.   
  Results of Chakravati and Janiszewski (2004) show that when generic 
advertising delivers messages that differentiate attributes of taste, the appeal of the   - 10 -
higher quality brand (‘premium brands’) are increased. The reverse case is found when 
generic advertising discusses the non-differentiating attribute of nutrition (p 497). Based 
on findings from Chakravati and Janiszewski (2004), we can determine the directions of 









g B ∂ ∂
∂ δ
 
First, if generic advertising focuses on the differentiating attributes (informative 
advertising), then the appeal of the high quality brand increases, but the appeal of low 










<0. In this case, 
the partial derivative of advertising expenditure for brand 1 with respect to generic 






1 <0, while the partial derivative of advertising 







>0. As a result, the generic advertising helps the effectiveness of brand advertising for 
the high quality product, brand 1, i.e.( ) g B ∂ ∂ Π ∂ 1
*
1
2 >0. Firm 2 producing low quality 
product would do not conduct its own brand advertising under this circumstance 
because there would be no benefits from the generic advertising because the partial 
derivative the product differentiation with respect to brand advertising expenditures, 
2 B ∂
∂δ









<0.   
Second, if generic advertising messages focus on non-differentiating attributes 
(persuasive advertising), the generic advertising messages are likely to deter the brand 






  <0, while the generic advertising messages are likely to help the 
brand 2’s advertising effort to reduce the product differentiation, i.e., 




>0. In this 
case, the firm 1 should spend more for the brand advertising, but firm 2 may save its 
brand advertising cost.    With this condition, the effect of generic advertising on the 




Hence, in this case the generic advertising may actually hurt the effectiveness of brand 
advertising from the high quality firm (brand 1). In contrast, the low quality firm (brand 
2) can get benefit from the generic advertising because  ( ) g B ∂ ∂ Π ∂ 1
*
1
2   >0. 
   
4. Results 
In this paper, we try to investigate whether the generic advertising helps or hurts the 
brand advertising under vertical product differentiation market. We divide the role of 
generic advertising into two cases: case 1, generic advertising focuses on differentiating 
attributes of products, and case 2, undifferentiating attributes. When generic advertising 
delivers messages that differentiate quality attributes, the brand advertising for high 
quality brand would benefit from the generic advertising since the generic advertising 
messages would help increase the degree of product differentiation in the market. In this 
case, the low quality brand would lose from generic advertising that delivers product 
differentiation messages. When generic advertising brings the information of the 
undifferentiating and generic attributes of products, the effectiveness of high quality 
brand advertising would decrease due to the generic messages from generic advertising. 
The firm producing high quality products should spend more advertising cost to   - 12 -
increase the product differentiation. However, the firm producing low quality products 
would benefit from generic advertising because the generic message from generic 
advertising would help lower the product differentiation in the market.       
 
5. Directions for Further Research 
The analytical framework should be extended to the empirical verification of the 
relationship between generic and brand advertising.    Empirical simulations will be 
conducted and presented at the conference.   
   - 13 -
1. Singh and Vives (1984) define the degree of product differentiation more precisely. In 
this paper we use more simplified notation of it for the derivation.   - 14 -
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